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In 1908, Congress authorized payments to local governments, including counties and school districts,
to compensate for the non-taxable status of the newly established forest reserves within their boundaries. The original program shared revenue generated from commercial activities on public lands,
e.g. timber harvesting, not anticipating the major changes in the volume and types of activities on
National Forest lands, particularly in the Pacific Northwest, that have played out over the past century. Two subsequent reforms – the appropriated Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) in 1976 and
‘transition’ payments made between 1990 and 2018, including payments associated with the Northwest Forest Plan and the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) – have
yet to deliver a permanent or effective policy solution that matches county payments to local governments’ economic needs or forest management objectives. This paper analyzes three policy options: a
status quo option of PILT and revenue sharing payments; reauthorization of SRS; and the creation of
a new permanent trust fund at the federal level. The paper concludes that the trust option (‘County
Payments 4.0’) could resolve key challenges by stabilizing and growing revenue over time, eliminating the need for cycles of conditional appropriations, and providing flexibility to address economic
and forest management needs in public land counties.
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I

n 1908, Congress authorized
‘county payments’ to local governments, including counties and
school districts, to compensate for
the non-taxable status of the
newly-established forest reserves
within their boundaries. This original program based payment levels on commercial
activities on public lands, e.g. timber harvesting, not anticipating the major changes in the
volume and types of activities on National
Forest lands that have played out over the
past century, particularly in the Pacific
Northwest region. Two subsequent re-

forms—the permanently-authorized Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) in 1976 and
‘transition’ payments beginning in the 1990s
– authorized by the Northwest Forest Plan
and the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS) between
2001 and 2018 have yet to deliver a permanent or effective policy solution. The way
that county payments are made, including the
certainty of payments and the source of funding, is one of the most important and underappreciated policies affecting the fiscal and
economic well-being of many public land
counties and the way that public lands are
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managed. Existing programs have exacerbated fiscal dependence on uncertain and inequitable payments in many public lands
counties, discouraged economic diversification, and contributed to fiscal crises in the Pacific Northwest counties historically most dependent on payments.
A long-term county payments solution must address two fundamental concerns:
the economic challenges and opportunities
for public lands counties in the 21st century
economy, and the problems of uncertainty,
inequitable distribution, and misdirected incentives generated by previous county payments policies and their implementation.
This paper analyzes three policy options, including a permanent return to a revenue sharing model, a long-term reauthorization of
SRS, and an endowment model that would
create a new permanent natural resource trust
at the federal level. These options are compared according to total payment amount,
payment equity (measured as the share of
payments allocated to metropolitan vs. nonmetropolitan counties), predictability of payments, and the cost of appropriations over a
35-year period.
To provide context for the policy
analysis, this paper begins with a description
of the changing economic geography of the
U.S. and the Pacific Northwest focused on
implications for public land counties and local government finance. Next, it reviews the
history of county payment policies and how
these programs exacerbate the challenges rural counties face in succeeding in the new
economy. The paper then turns to the analysis
of the three policy options and ends with a
discussion of the endowment model and its
potential to resolve the key challenges associated with existing models of compensation
1

by stabilizing and growing revenue over
time, eliminating the need for cycles of conditional appropriations, and providing flexibility to address economic and forest management needs in public land counties.
Changing Economic Geography of the Pacific Northwest
In the Pacific Northwest, a sharp decline in
timber employment in the 1990s played out
across a diverse and changing economic geography. To explain the nature of these
changes and their implications, this section
begins with a broader discussion of trends in
the U.S. and the West’s economy, including
a structural shift from goods-producing to
service-providing jobs and increasing geographic inequality among counties.
The West is the fastest-growing region of the U.S.1 and has added jobs and population at roughly twice the rate of the rest of
the U.S. since 1970 (U.S. Department of
Commerce 2017). Personal income growth
among western counties also outpaced the
rest of the nation. Most of the growth in new
jobs (92 percent) and income are in a variety
of services occupations, including high-wage
earners such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, and low-wage earners such as retail and restaurant workers (U.S. Department
of Commerce 2017).2 The most important of
the new services occupations are a set of
high-wage jobs in ‘innovation’ sectors including software, research and development,
finance, and technology. These high-wage
jobs function the same as a traditional mining
or manufacturing job by exporting ideas and
services to clients across the U.S. and the
world while returning income to the county

In this paper, the ‘West’ is defined as the 11 western states in the continental U.S.: Arizona, Colorado, California,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
2
For details on services industries, see North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) definitions, available here: https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/metro-micro/about/omb-standards.html.
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where they are located, which in turn generates additional economic activity in other
sectors (e.g. they have multipliers that create
additional jobs in related sectors) (Moretti
2012).
At the same time, employment and income in non-services sectors, including manufacturing, natural resources, and agriculture,
have declined as a share of total employment
and income, and in some cases in absolute
terms in the West since 1970. The ‘great decoupling’ describes the fact that mechanization and productivity gains in the U.S. economy have not resulted in more middle-income jobs or higher family incomes beginning in the 1970s and accelerating since
about 2000 (Brynjolfsson and Mcafee 2012).
In manufacturing, for example, increases in
productivity led to fewer, not more jobs – the
U.S. manufacturing sector added more than
$500 billion to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) between 1980 and 2016 while eight
million manufacturing jobs were lost.
Productivity gains also led to employment
losses in other sectors of the U.S. economy
where jobs are more easily automated including agriculture, timber, mining, and retail
trade. Coal mining in the U.S., for example,
lost 160,000 jobs between 1980 and 2010 as
coal production increased 40 percent nationally (U.S. Department of Labor 2017). In timber, consolidation and automation of timber
mills and mechanization in timber harvesting
increased labor productivity and weakened
the link between the level of timber harvests
and employment (Oregon Office of Economic Analysis 2017).
Another important trend is the increasing importance of non-labor income.
From 2000 to 2016, non-labor income in the
United States grew by 55.4 percent compared
to 23.3 percent growth in labor income. In the
3

West, non-labor income from investment-related sources and age-related and hardshiprelated transfer payments accounted for 52
percent of net growth in real personal income
during 2000-2016 and made up 37 percent of
total personal income in 2016. The largest
component of non-labor income is investment-related sources (dividends, interest, and
rent) followed by age-related transfer payments (e.g. Social Security and Medicare)
and hardship-related payments (e.g. Welfare
and Medicaid) (Lawson, Rasker, and Gude
2014).
These structural shifts away from
goods-producing to service-providing sectors
are associated with increasing geographic inequality. Innovation jobs and other highwage services jobs tend to locate in cities
around clusters of creative employees, companies, and finance (Glaeser 2011; Moretti
2012). Rural areas relatively remote from cities are not competing as well for these new
services sector jobs due to relative isolation
from markets (Goetz, Partridge, and Stephens
2017; Rasker et al. 2009). At the same time,
rural counties tend to be more acutely affected by the challenges associated with
productivity gains and trade that have reduced employment in natural resources sectors and manufacturing (Hicks and Devaraj
2015).
The same geographic implications of
restructuring are visible in the Pacific Northwest since 1990.3 The region covered by the
Northwest Forest Plan lost 30,000 jobs in the
timber industry in the 1990s. Despite these
losses, 1.4 million new jobs were created in
other sectors (primarily services) over the
same period (Charnley 2006). The recent performance of formerly timber-dependent
counties, however, is mixed. Some rural
counties are adding people, jobs, and income,

The Pacific Northwest is defined as all counties in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, and counties in Northern California (Del Norte, Glenn, Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, Shasta, Siskiyou, Tehama, and Trinity) and western Montana (Deer Lodge, Flathead, Granite, Lake, Lewis and Clark, Lincoln, Mineral, Missoula, Powell, Ravalli, Sanders,
and Silver Bow).
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including those connected to cities and those
attracting workers and retirees to remote,
high-amenity landscapes (Chen and Weber
2011; Goetz et al. 2017; Johnson and
Cromartie 2006). Rural communities relatively isolated from metropolitan markets
have grown more slowly since 1990, however their performance, while poor relative to
metropolitan counties, is similar to peer nonmetro counties that were not historically dependent on timber (Rasker 2017).
The uneven economic performance of
formerly timber-dependent communities is
explained in large part by the trajectory they
were on in the late-1980s (Charnley et al.
2006). Counties already beginning to diversify and grow outside the timber industry before the Northwest Forest Plan was adopted
in 1994 continued to grow despite the sharp
decline in a major employment sector. Rural
and relatively isolated communities experienced the declines in timber harvest on federal land most acutely.
Interventions included in the Northwest Forest Plan intended to stabilize and
transition the economies of timber-dependent
communities generally failed to overcome
the structural and geographic context. In particular, efforts to stabilize timber supply, albeit at lower levels, were not met (volumes
offered for sale averaged only 54 percent of
target volumes) and overemphasized an outmoded supply-side development model (Kilkenny and Partridge 2009) that ignored the
effects of changes in the timber industry, including mill consolidation, productivity
gains, increasing trade, and reduced timber
demand, responsible for two-thirds of job
losses in timber in the Northwest Forest Plan
region (Charnley et al. 2006).

4

Lessons from the Northwest Forest
Plan reveal that timber counties were more
complex and diverse than the stabilization
model anticipated. In the new economy, a
community’s assets – such as quality education, health care services, and a high quality
of life – play increasingly important roles in
distinguishing rural places, even for remote
and resource-dependent communities (Halseth et al. 2006; Kashdan and Nothstine
2014; Kitson, Martin, and Tyler 2004;
Markey, Halseth, and Manson 2008; Power
2006).
The increasing importance of a community’s amenities, infrastructure, and services to economic well-being places greater
importance on the role county governments
play in economic development activities. The
next section provides more detail about the
expanded and vital role of local governments
in economic development and highlights the
important role of fiscal policy related to natural resources, including county payments.4
County Government Finance and County
Payments
Counties are the largest political subdivisions
of states and have responsibility to provide
basic public services, including public works
such as roads and bridges and public safety.
Another primary responsibility of county
governments is administering state mandates,
such as organizing elections, assessing property, issuing licenses, and recording documents.
To discharge these roles and responsibilities, counties have revenue-generating
authority and receive grants and distributions
from state and federal governments. Counties

County payments from the Forest Service also are distributed to local autonomous school districts. Schools in
some states will be affected by changes in county payments policy and funding, but to a lesser extent than county
governments due to state school equalization policy, particularly in Oregon and Washington. Gebert, Krista M., David E. Calkin, and Ervin G. Schuster. 2004. “The Secure Rural Schools Act of 2000: Does It Make Rural Schools
Secure?” Journal of Education Finance 30(2):176-186.
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in the Pacific Northwest generate revenue directly through property taxes, local sales
taxes, and a variety of charges and fees.
These sources of local revenue made up twothirds (66 percent) of all county government
revenue in the Pacific Northwest in 2012
(U.S. Census of Governments 2012). Intergovernmental revenue, including county payments programs addressed in this paper, and
other distributions and grants from state and
federal governments, make up the remaining
third of county government revenue. Regionwide, county payments average three percent
of total governmental revenue, but can be
more important in some counties; county
payments contributed a third or more of total
governmental revenue in eight counties, a
fifth or more in another 16 counties, and 10
percent or more in another 22 counties (U.S.
Census of Governments 2012; U.S. Department of Agriculture 2017a; U.S. Department
of Agriculture 2017b; U.S. Department of Interior 2017a; U.S. Department of Interior
2017b).
In the Pacific Northwest, county governments play a key role in local and regional
economic and community well-being. In addition to basic infrastructure and services,
many counties provide community health and
social services, environmental conservation,
parks and trail infrastructure, libraries, and
cultural services. Many counties also play an
expanding role in economic development activities including workforce development,
business support, and marketing activities in
response to changing demographics, funding,
and economic pressures (Berman and Salant
1996; Istrate 2014). Public-private partnerships and collaborations with the business
community and nonprofits are emerging as
key strategies to provide services critical to
rural economic development (Agranoff and
McGuire 2004; Sullivan, Ryser, and Halseth
2014). The increasing role for county govern5

ments in economic development in the Pacific Northwest and the significant contributions of county payments to many county
budgets speaks to the importance of federal
fiscal policy in public land counties. The next
section reviews the history and status of the
largest county payments programs in the Pacific Northwest.
History of County Payments
County payment programs fall into three periods that correspond to major changes in the
way payments are funded and distributed
among counties. We use a version model to
distinguish among these periods: ‘County
Payments 1.0’ refers to the period between
1908 and 1976 during which payments were
established and funded exclusively from
commercial receipts; 2.0 begins in 1976 with
the addition of PILT; and 3.0 describes the
period between 1990 and 2018 during which
‘transition’ payments decoupled Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) O&C5 payments from commodity receipts and added economic diversification
and collaboration as new goals for county
payment programs. The transition payments
of county payments 3.0 expire in 2019, renewing debate about the long-term viability
and purpose of county payments programs.
County Payments 1.0: Compensation Linked
to Commodities, 1908-1976
Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief Forester of
the U.S. Forest Service, advocated for the inaugural county payments program on the rationale that sharing the proceeds from the
conservation and sustainable use of public
lands provided for fair and sufficient payments in lieu of taxes that governments could
collect were the lands privately held. These
first payments were equal to 25 percent of the

O&C Lands refer to the Oregon and California Railroad Grant Lands.
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proceeds from commercial activities on public lands, mainly from timber sales; hence,
the program became known as the ‘25 Percent Fund’ (see Figure 1).6 Payments were restricted to funding county roads and local
school districts; state governments determined the allocation of payments between
these uses. For the entire period between
1908 and World War II, total payments averaged $10 million annually.7
During this period, the BLM began
sharing commercial receipts generated on the
O&C Lands with counties and schools.8 The
O&C lands refer to BLM lands initially
granted to the railroads as private land but
subsequently revested to the federal government and managed for timber harvests. Fifty
percent of the proceeds of timber sales on

O&C lands accrue to county governments using a formula based on the relative taxable
value of land in the counties in 1915.9
After World War II, payments increased substantially as timber extracted
from public lands helped to fuel the nation’s
housing boom. From 1945 to 1980, payments
averaged $391 million, reaching a high of
$1.2 billion in 1977 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2016).
County Payments 2.0: PILT Addresses Equity, Uncertainty, and Incentives, 1976-1990
As county payments increased in size after
World War II, weaknesses in the revenue
sharing model became more noticeable. In

Figure 1. Key Developments and Reforms in County Payments, 1908-2016
6

Act of May 23, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-136.
Unless noted otherwise, all values in this paper are adjusted for inflation to 2016 dollars.
8
O&C Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 74-405, tit. II(a) (1937). The county government share of the O&C payments is not
restricted to roads but can be used for any governmental purpose.
9
Act of June 24, 1954 (68 Stat. 270). Payments are based on the “value of O&C lands assuming the same value for all
lands as the average value of those lands that were assessed in 1915.”
7
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1970, the Public Lands Law Review Commission wrote: “Although they were originally designed to offset the tax immunity of
Federal Lands, the existing revenue sharing
programs do not meet a standard of equity
and fair treatment either to state and local
governments or to the Federal taxpayers”
(1970:237). Payments proved to be too unpredictable for local governments to use for
effective annual budgeting, to engage in
long-term planning, or to pay for costly infrastructure improvements. On a national basis,
payments could rise and fall on the order of
30 percent annually (Hoover 2015) with individual counties experiencing even more extreme volatility.
Payments based on the commercial
values generated on public lands also were
unequally distributed among counties. Counties in Oregon, the leading producer of public
land timber, received more than a third of total revenue sharing payments while counties
in states with relatively lower-value commercial logging on public land received little
compensation by comparison, leading the
Public Lands Law Review Commission to
write: “In some cases, payments made by
Federal programs undercompensate, while in
others they overcompensate.” The report
added that payments based on commercial
activities created perverse incentives for
counties such that “pressures can be generated to institute programs that will produce
revenue, though such programs might be in
conflict with good conservation practices”
(1970:237).
These concerns eventually led Congress to pass Payments in Lieu of Taxes
(PILT) in 1976.10 PILT is a formula-driven
payment based primarily on the number of
acres of eligible ‘entitlement land’ in each
county. The authorized payment based on
acreage is reduced by ‘prior year payments’

10
11

received from other county payment programs (including the Forest Service 25%
Fund payments, but BLM O&C payments are
exempt from the PILT formula) and is limited
for all counties based on their population.11
PILT is funded with appropriations from the
U.S. Treasury (Corn 2008; Schuster 1995). In
these ways, PILT is designed to work in concert with revenue sharing payments to improve the equity and stability of compensation for non-taxable federal lands.
County Payments 3.0: Transition Payments
Decoupled from Commodity Receipts, 19902016
Declining timber harvests after 1989 lowered
revenue sharing payments to counties—by
more than 90 percent in some Pacific Northwest counties (Hoover 2015). To stabilize annual revenue sharing amounts, Congress began making ‘transition’ payments to counties
where declining receipts create major revenue shortfalls. The first transition payments
were made in 1990 only to the BLM O&C
counties in Oregon, but established a framework that would be utilized later in larger
programs extended to Forest Service public
land counties as well. These first transition
payments established a ‘floor’ payment based
on the average revenue sharing payment
amount during the five-year period 1986 to
1990. The floor payment was paid from appropriations between 1990 and 1993 (U.S.
Department of Interior 2016). The Northwest
Forest Plan extended transition payments to
all BLM and Forest Service public land counties covered by the Plan. The so-called ‘spotted owl’ transition payments separated timber
harvests from county compensation by guaranteeing a minimum (floor) payment equal to
85 percent of the five-year average payment
during 1986 to 1990. As part of the planned
transition, the value declined to 58 percent in

Pub. L. 94-565, 1976.
The population ceiling payment is reduced for smaller-population counties.
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2003 after which the program was meant to
expire (Tuchmann et al. 1996).
In 2000, Congress passed the Secure
Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act (SRS). SRS effectively extended
transition payments nationally to address a
similar decline in commercial receipts and
revenue sharing payments from public
lands.12 Initially authorized for six years, SRS
provided optional payments equal to 85 percent of the highest three years of revenue
sharing payments between 1986 and 1999.13
An important part of the negotiation
over SRS was the desire on the part of some
counties to maintain the link between public
land management and county payments. The
National Association of Counties lobbied
successfully to allow counties to elect to retain their revenue sharing payment under
SRS (Hoover 2015). Inherent to this debate
was a fundamental disagreement about the
nature of the transition. Some timber-dependent communities argued the transition was a
period of adjustment that would eventually
allow the land management agencies to restore timber harvests to previous levels with
new environmental safeguards in place. As
justification they pointed to the O&C Act that
mandates these revested lands be used to supply a steady flow of timber to support local
economies (Association of O&C Counties
2018).
Another view was that SRS intended
to enable counties to move away from timber
toward a more diverse economy. A more diverse economy would, in theory, generate
new sources of governmental revenue that
12

would stabilize local government budgets
and end the need for transition payments
funded by Congress (Hoover 2015). To help
accomplish a transition away from dependence on timber, SRS increased funding from
85 percent of historic payments to 100 percent. The additional 15 percent was allocated
between two new Titles in the SRS law.
Funds allocated to Title II supported public
land projects recommended to the land management agencies by Resource Advisory
Councils (RACs). Title II funding opened the
possibility for new collaborative efforts to
address economic development goals on public lands. Title III funds could be used on special county projects including reimbursement
for emergency services provided on federal
lands and funding for community fire plans
and Firewise activities.
Reauthorization and reforms in 2008
went further by altering the SRS funding formula to include a per-capita personal income
adjustment that directed relatively higher
payments to counties with low per-capita personal income and provided a significant temporary increase in funding. This new goal of
economic equity in county payments had the
effect of directing larger payments to nonmetropolitan counties with relatively poor
economic performance. The increased funding level also returned payments close to historic highs. (On a national level, only payments in the years 1977 to 1980 exceeded the
FY 2008 payment levels in real terms).

Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-393.
Under Section 102(a) and 103(a), states eligible to receive Forest Service and/or BLM revenue sharing payments
can elect to receive either (1) the Twenty-Five Percent (Forest Service) or Fifty Percent (BLM) Payment or (2) the ‘full
payment amount,’ calculated as the average of the three highest yearly revenue sharing payments from FY 1986 to FY
1999. The SRS payment was tied to the average of the three highest historical payments to each state as a means of
further reducing the volatility of timber receipts at the county level. Under the 2000 version of the SRS Act, funding
for payments to states and counties is derived from revenues, fees, penalties, or miscellaneous receipts received by the
federal government from activities of the Forest Service on National Forest land, and the Bureau of Land Management
on revested and reconveyed grant lands (lands returned to federal ownership). Pub. L. No. 106-393, §§102(b)(3),
103(b)(2). To the extent of any shortfall, payments are derived from Treasury funds not otherwise appropriated.
13
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Status at the Time of Writing
The expiration of SRS in FY 2018 effectively
ends transition payments and returns to
County Payments version 2.0 – that is, PILT
and revenue sharing payments made under
the Forest Service Act of 1908 and BLM
O&C Act of 1937. It also creates an opportunity to advance a new approach. One option
is to reauthorize SRS. Since the four year authorization in 2008, SRS has been extended
multiple times at one or two year intervals at
declining amounts. The requirement to secure authorization and appropriation on a recurring basis does not appear to be a longterm solution. Another option is to revert to
revenue sharing payments permanently. The
President’s FY 2019 proposed budget would
not reauthorize SRS and would limit appropriations for PILT. If the budget proposal is
accepted by Congress, total payments to
counties and schools in the Pacific Northwest
will decline by half from $260 million in FY
2015 to $131 million in FY 2019. The cuts
would hit rural counties and schools hardest,
with payments falling by greater than 80 percent in several counties and metropolitan
counties receiving a larger proportion of total
payments – undoing the redistribution of payments from metropolitan to non-metropolitan
counties achieved by SRS (Headwaters Economics 2018).14
Implications of Ending Transition Payments
to Counties
The expiration of transition payments has renewed the issues of equity, uncertainty, and
incentives associated with revenue sharing
payments. Changes in the regional economy
and new taxation and expenditure limitations
on local governments since transition payments began in 1990 add new urgency to re-

14

solving these challenges. This section describes the ways in which the recent history
of county payments has worked against efforts to enhance county fiscal health, economic development, and federal land management.
Local decisions to utilize county payments to maintain low tax rates have led to
reliance on federal payments to maintain annual government budgets. For example, the
Oregon counties that historically received the
largest revenue sharing payments maintained
among the lowest property tax rates and the
lowest local revenue per capita of all counties
in the state (Oregon Secretary of State 2016).
State taxation and expenditure limitations (TELs) have exacerbated reliance on
county payments by making it more difficult
to raise local tax revenue to replace declining
county payments (Mullins and Wallin 2004;
Stallmann et al. 2017). TELs typically restrict
budget and tax levy increases to the rate of
inflation with some provisions for new
growth. For example, Oregon’s Measures 5
and 50 passed in 1990 and 1997 limited property tax rates, lowered property assessed values, and limited growth in assessed values
(Oregon Department of Revenue 2009). Tax
increases require voter approval at the local
level. These limitations on local revenue authority and capacity entrench a model of anemic local taxation. Efforts to increase local
tax levies have failed, resulting in fiscal stress
and deep cuts to services (Johnson 2017).
Other states have limited local revenue authority in similar although typically less stringent ways. Notably, Idaho limits growth in
revenue received from property taxes to three
percent annual growth without voter approval, with some allowances for new construction and annexation (importantly, new
industrial property is not exempt from the
revenue limits) (Idaho State Tax Commission
2017).

Headwaters Economics estimates. To see a data visualization of the county-by-county change in payments, see
https://headwaterseconomics.org/county-payments/policy-options/presidents-budget-cuts-county-payments/.
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These local and state policies and
practices entrench dependence on annual
payments through PILT, SRS, and revenue
sharing programs. Dependence on uncertain
receipts and federal appropriations has fiscal
and economic implications for counties.
The National Association of Counties
reports that the expiration of SRS and limits
on PILT’s appropriation (as proposed by the
Trump Administration) will require sharp
budget cuts in many counties (Shuffield
2017). Testimony from several county commissioners to a Senate Committee in May
2017 illustrated the revenue and budget impacts of declining county payments (U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources 2017). Cuts to critical services, including education, public safety, road infrastructure, and libraries, can have implications
for rural communities because of the increased importance of local government services, partnerships, and initiatives for economic development. For example, Idaho and
Clearwater counties in Idaho could lose more
than half their federal payments, a decline of
more than $7 million and $1.1 million, respectively. The two counties together lost
population between 2011 and 2015 (the latest
year for which data are available) and have
more than 500 fewer jobs in 2015 as compared to 2007, before the start of the Great
Recession. Declining enrollment at Clearwater County’s schools and reduced budgets
jeopardize gifted and talented programs,
shop, art, and music classes. The school district is now on a four-day week and cannot
support day-long kindergarten classes. Retaining and attracting families and businesses
becomes increasingly difficult without robust
community services and school programs
(Haggerty 2017).
Another implication of over-reliance on
federal payments is to discourage economic
development in other sectors outside of commercial timber in public land counties. The
Oregon Governor’s Task Force on Federal

Forest Payments and County Services
(2009:40) found that:
In 1995, Alcan Cable, an industrial
manufacturer, located in Douglas
County. By 2008, the value of Alcan
Cable’s plant and 200 new homes to
house employees resulted in only
$63,000 of county taxes for public services. A typical Deputy Sheriff now
costs Douglas County $75,320 per
year, or 20 percent more than public
revenues generated from this extensive
development. Contrast that with a medium-sized saw mill cutting 60 million
board feet of timber per year purchased
from federal O&C forests. At about
$300 per thousand board feet, the cost
to the mill of that timber was $18 million. One-half of those revenues, or $9
million, was shared with O&C counties as discretionary revenues. Of that
$9 million, Douglas County received
$2,254,500, over 35 times the property
taxes generated by the Alcan plushomes development.
This dynamic prompted Jackson County, Oregon Commissioner and Task Force member
C.W. Smith to remark: “Most of these counties can’t build themselves or develop themselves into solvency. Every new resident is a
negative on the budget” (Oregon Governor’s
Task Force on Federal Forest Payments and
County Services 2009:40). As a result, counties overemphasize activities that could increase commercial receipts on federal public
land and discount alternatives that generate
less revenue but could diversify and grow
economies. For example, concerns about lost
revenue potential associated with assigning
conservation to timber lands were the basis of
opposition from the Association of O&C
Counties to expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou
National Monument (Cevagske 2017).
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The uncertainty – and promise – of
continued appropriations or of renewed timber receipts from increased harvest keeps
some local officials focused on these solutions instead of exploring alternatives
(Mortensen 2012), a dynamic that mirrors the
‘flickering’ of extractive industries, such as
mines opening and closing with commodity
cycles (Freudenberg 1992). Flickering can
discourage communities from recognizing
and accepting economic transition (Haggerty
et al. 2018) and from making efforts to adapt
to the changing economy. Rhetoric from
members of Congress and the current Administration that promises to restore a sustained
yield management regime to National Forest
and the BLM O&C timber lands – including
proposals to mandate annual harvest levels,
increase the scale of categorical exclusions
for timber projects, and limit judicial review
of federal decisions, among other strategies –
maintains the hope for some counties that
changes to federal policy will resolve economic and fiscal challenges at home.
Increasing receipts on public lands
may not be a viable long-term solution for a
variety of reasons. The Forest Service
stresses that generating receipts sufficient to
meet the needs and expectations of counties
year over year is unrealistic under variable
market conditions and budget realities (Tidwell 2014). The recent agreement in Congress on a fire funding fix, forest management reform, and a two-year extension of
SRS as part of a major budget agreement left
out the most aggressive efforts to increase the
pace and scale of timber harvest, which may
indicate that the land management agencies
likely do not have the social license to increase and sustain cuts at historic levels.
Smaller efforts, including sharing a portion of
receipts from stewardship contracts, would
not increase payments materially. Stewardship receipts would add less than $6 million
annually to revenue sharing payments (Rural
Voices for Conservation Coalition 2017).

More fundamentally, a reliance on sustained
commercial timber harvests to fund county
payments perpetuates the disconnect between
the narrow fiscal goals of federal land management (maximize timber harvest) and the
broader and changing economic values of
public lands including the emerging restoration economy (BenDor et al. 2015; Hibbard
and Lurie 2013).
These outcomes are consistent with a
large body of academic literature focused on
the challenges associated with translating resource wealth into long-run economic growth
and community well-being. In short, access
to resource endowments does not automatically lead to economic prosperity or decline.
Instead, policy choices, including fiscal policies, affect the long-term outcomes of resource extraction (Haggerty and Haggerty
2015). Fiscal policies that invest revenue
from resource extraction into long-term savings, community infrastructure, and economic development activities in resource regions can diversify economies and lead to a
virtuous cycle of growth from the initial resource endowment (Gunton 2003). Alternatively, fiscal policies that lead to an over-reliance on annual revenue from volatile resource sources, for example, by spending resource revenue on annual budgets and to
maintain low taxes on other sectors of the
economy, can discourage economic diversification and lead to slower long-term growth –
a resource curse (Morrison-Saunders et al.
2016; Taylor, Hufford, and Bilbrey 2016).
The experiences of counties in the Pacific Northwest and lessons drawn from longterm study of resource-dependent communities suggest what could be done to improve
the way counties are compensated for nontaxable federal land. Historic approaches that
based compensation on volatile commercial
receipts and uncertain discretionary appropriations have undermined fiscal health in public land counties, limited economic development opportunities, and influenced forest

COUNTY PAYMENTS 4.0

management decisions. During a Senate
hearing in May 2017, Senator Murkowski (RAK) argued for an end to the “annual cycle of
begging” for SRS and PILT appropriations,
suggesting the possibility of a new path for
county payments. She cited the importance of
timber management reform for forest health
and to sustain rural employment opportunities, but added that timber harvests alone are
unlikely to provide a fiscal solution. For this,
she recommended considering new ideas.
The next section provides a policy analysis of
three possible paths: revenue sharing, continued appropriations, and a hybrid approach
that would use commercial receipts to build
an endowment as the funding source for reauthorization of SRS.

primary funding model for county payments
over time.
These policy options, including the
endowment model, are analyzed on several
metrics: total size of the payment to local
governments, payment equity (measured as
the share of payments distributed to metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties), and
the cost to the U.S. Treasury. The endowment
model can be evaluated based on the size of
the fund required to replace other funding
sources, the time (in years) to build up an endowment of sufficient size, and the total cost
to the U.S. Treasury to establish the endowment.

Analysis of County Payment Scenarios

The President’s FY 2019 budget request
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget
2018) does not recommend reauthorizing
SRS, meaning eligible public land counties
will receive a revenue sharing payment from
the Forest Service 25% Fund and a BLM
O&C 50% Revenue Sharing payment. The
budget proposal estimates that revenue sharing payments for the two programs in FY
2019 will be valued at $75 million, a decline
from the actual FY 2017 revenue sharing
payments of $78 million. Revenue sharing
payments are made on a seven-year rolling
average basis, attenuating annual change associated with increasing or declining commodity receipts. For this analysis, revenue
sharing payments are estimated to average
$80 million for the 35-year analysis period.

This section analyzes several policy options
for Forest Service, BLM O&C, and PILT
payments, including:
•
•

•

Option 1: Returning to a revenue
sharing model and funding PILT at
the full authorized payment amount.
Option 2: Returning to a revenue
sharing model and limiting PILT
funding to a level below the full authorized payment amount.
Option 3: Implementing a long-term
reauthorization of SRS and funding
PILT at the full authorized payment
amount.

Without additional reform, these policy options would be funded annually with a
combination of commercial receipts and discretionary appropriations. Alternatively, a
new endowment model would create a permanent trust that would be funded with annual commercial receipts. Distributions from
the endowment would replace commercial
receipts and appropriations to become the

Revenue Sharing

SRS Reauthorization
SRS expires again in FY 2019, but efforts to
reauthorize the payments are expected to
continue and include recommendations for a
permanent authorization and mandatory
funding. This paper assumes a permanent authorization and annual appropriations fixed at
the FY 2015 level for the analysis period.
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PILT
The President’s Budget requests a $397 million appropriation for PILT in FY 2019,
equal to the most recent ten-year average of
PILT payments. The request is lower than the
actual FY 2017 payment of $465 million, and
lower than the authorized payment for FY
2018 of $530 million. The higher FY 2018
PILT payment reflects lower prior-year payments to counties for FY 2016. In that year,
SRS was not paid and counties received only
a revenue sharing payment.15 If PILT is
funded below the authorized amount, appropriated payments are reduced proportionally
for all eligible jurisdictions.
The PILT formula is calculated under
each of the policy options to estimate the total
payment to counties and schools, payment
equity, and the total cost of appropriations
from the U.S. Treasury.
Endowment Model
The Endowment Model option would create
a new permanent trust funded with annual
commercial receipts, including the Forest
Service 25% Fund receipts and BLM O&C
50% Revenue Sharing receipts. The principal
balance of the permanent trust would be held
in perpetuity and invested to earn income. At
the end of each fiscal year, the permanent
trust would make distributions that would
benefit public land counties. Initially, distributions from the permanent trust would be
smaller than the value of commercial receipts
deposited into the permanent trust. During
this period, Congress would authorize appropriations to make up the difference between
the value of distributions from the permanent
trust and an authorized county payment level

15

(e.g. the value of forgone revenue sharing
payments or some other payment level). During this period, distributions from the permanent trust would go first to the Treasury to
offset the cost of appropriations.
Congress also could make a one-time
payment to capitalize the permanent trust. A
capital payment would reduce the time before
distributions from the trust grew to sufficient
size to eliminate the need for continued annual appropriations to fund county payments.
Comparison of County Payment Options in
the Pacific Northwest
Tables 1 and 2 show that Option 2 (a
return to a revenue sharing model and limited
PILT funding) would result in the lowest total
payments to Pacific Northwest counties
($130 million), the least-equitable payments
among metropolitan and non-metropolitan
counties (metro counties would receive 37%
of the total payment), and the lowest costs to
the U.S. Treasury ($96 million annually). The
change in the distribution of payments among
metro and non-metro counties is the result of
two factors. First, a return to revenue sharing
payments ends the equity-based components
of the SRS formula (including the per-capita
personal income adjustment), increasing the
inequity of payments overall. Second, lower
prior-year payments from the Forest Service
(BLM O&C payments are exempt from the
PILT prior-year payment calculation) effectively shift a larger share of the total PILT authorization to metropolitan counties less affected by the formula’s population limit.

The last SRS payment authorized for FY 2015 was paid to counties during FY 2016. These payments are reported
to the Department of Interior as prior-year payments for the PILT FY 2018 payment introducing a two-year lag between when Forest Service payments declined and when counties are eligible for a higher PILT payment.
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Table 1. Average annual payments from selected county payments programs and cost of appropriations
Policy Option

PILT Payment

Forest Service
Payment

Option 1: No SRS,
Full PILT

$131,016,000

$15,914,999

Option 2: No SRS,
Limited PILT

$96,443,367

Option 3: SRS,
Full PILT

$90,871,329

BLM O&C
Payment

Total Payment

Appropriation
Cost

$18,180,795

$165,111,894

$131,016,000

$15,914,999

$18,180,795

$130,539,162

$96,443,367

$133,733,900

$35,556,001

$260,171,230

$226,075,436

Table 2. Share of projected payments made to metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties16
Policy Option

Option 1: No SRS,
Full PILT

Payment to Metropolitan Counties
$58,921,037

Payment to NonMetropolitan
Counties
$106,190,857

Metro Share of Total Payment

Non-Metro Share
of Total Payment

36%

64%

Option 2: NO SRS,
Limited PILT

$48,075,410

$82,463,751

37%

63%

Option 3: SRS, Full
PILT

$71,333,217

$188,838,014

27%

73%

Table 3. Endowment Model treasury cost and timing
Endowment Options

Size of Endowment Required

Years to Build Endowment w/Receipts

Option 1 with Endowment

$852,394,855

20

Avg. Annual Treasury
Cost Compared to
Options 1 & 3
$17,689.482

Option 3 with Endowment

$4,232,497,536

68

-$33,307,223

By comparison, reauthorizing SRS
would provide relatively higher ($260 million) and more equitable payments (metro
counties would receive 27% of the total payment) relative to the revenue sharing options,
but at higher cost to the U.S. Treasury ($226
million annually). The cost of the SRS reauthorization is offset somewhat by a lower
PILT authorization, but still increases the

16

cost of appropriations by $95 million compared to a revenue sharing model with PILT
funded at the full authorized amount.
Table 3 compares several options for
how the Endowment Model could be pursued. Column two is an estimate of how large
the permanent trust balance would have to be
for distributions to replace the appropriated
funding level (in this case, equal to forgone
revenue sharing payments or equal to the

Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas are geographic entities defined by the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). A metropolitan area contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population. A micropolitan
area contains an urban core of at least 10,000, but less than 50,000, population. All other areas are classified as rural.
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value of an SRS reauthorization), or alternatively the size of a capital payment that would
eliminate the need for annual appropriations.
Column three estimates the time required to
build a permanent trust to the required size
using only commercial receipts. Column 4
compares the average annual cost of building
the permanent trust with commercial receipts
to the annual cost of SRS and PILT appropriations over the same period.
Compared to Options 1 and 3, the Endowment Model is more expensive in the
short term (in the first 10 years), particularly
if a large, one-time capitalization payment is
made. However, over time the endowment
model costs less (eventually eliminating the
need for annual appropriations) and would
increase county payments predictably year
over year at no cost to the U.S. Treasury after
the permanent trust reaches sufficient size.
An endowment could replace revenue sharing payments in 20 years at a cost of $350
million. After 20 years, county payments
would increase and PILT authorizations decrease annually. Replacing SRS appropriations with distributions from a permanent
trust would take 68 years, or could be done
immediately with an initial payment into the
endowment of $4.2 billion. Compared to a
permanent authorization of SRS at FY 2015
levels, the Endowment Model could cost $33
million less each year on average as distributions from the permanent trust increase in
amount and lower the annual cost of appropriations. After 68 years, payments to counties would increase and PILT authorizations
decrease annually.
The way distributions from the endowment are allocated among counties –
based on their relative contributions of commercial receipts or based on the SRS formula,
for example – also could resolve equity concerns associated with annual revenue sharing
payments.

Discussion: Endowing Public Land Counties
This analysis describes how a new option for
county payments – an endowment model –
could resolve the problems inherent to previous iterations of county payment policies and
address the specific challenges and opportunities associated with the changing economy
and economic geography of the West. The
endowment model idea is based on the experience of U.S. states and many countries
around the world in managing natural resource revenue and has several advantages
over current county payment models. First, it
still utilizes commercial receipts as the longterm funding source for county payments, but
stabilizes these revenues over time to guarantee predictable and increasing payments year
over year. Second, an endowment would not
require discretionary appropriations from
Congress after an initial period as the permanent trust increases in value. Third, decoupling county payments from annual commercial receipts would allow forest management
reform to move forward without a revenue
mandate, shifting the focus to management
strategies intended to restore forest health
and leverage economic development strategies sensitive to the various needs of different
types of public land counties.
Permanent Trusts in States and Other Nations
Utilizing permanent trusts to stabilize revenue and build an endowment from the extraction of natural resources is not a new idea.
Trusts are utilized by nearly every U.S. state
with significant natural resource wealth. For
example, Alaska, Louisiana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming have state land and severance taxes
trust funds with a combined value of more
than $100 billion (Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation 2009; Williams 2008; Wyoming

COUNTY PAYMENTS 4.0

Taxpayers Association 2015). Trusts also are
common internationally, led by Norway’s
massive sovereign wealth fund created from
oil revenue and valued at more than $950 billion (Johnson 2007).
The most relevant models for a federal public land endowment are the numerous
state trusts funded with royalties and fees
generated from commercial activities on
state-owned land, including timber harvests.
Beginning in 1803 with Ohio’s statehood, the
federal government transferred to new states
a portion of the public domain not yet
claimed by homesteaders, granted to railroads, or reserved for other purposes (Souder
and Fairfax 1996). In most western states, the
federal government transferred two sections
in each township. The lands were intended to
generate revenue for local schools and other
purposes. Initially, states often sold lands and
spent the proceeds of sales as they came in.
The unsustainability of this practice soon led
states to hold “trust lands” in perpetuity and
to establish permanent trust funds that would
receive the proceeds from the management of
trust lands. The principal balance of these
funds is invested to earn income, effectively
replacing an exhaustible resource endowment with a perpetual financial endowment
that funds public schools and other state institutions.
Norway’s experience also offers a
useful example. Oil production began in Norway’s North Sea waters in 1971. Price spikes
in oil in 1979 and 1980 generated significant
revenue to the government, and the government spent that money on an annual basis.
Norway’s economy grew rapidly with rising
wages, spending, and borrowing in the public
and private sector. When prices subsequently
collapsed in 1986, the economy’s dependence on annual oil revenue quickly precipitated a fiscal crisis. In 1990, while the country was still suffering high unemployment
and persistent cuts in government spending,
Norway established its permanent trust as a

forward-looking fiscal tool that would help
the country do better if and when the oil price
rose again. The trust was designed to buffer
the economy from the annual uncertainty in
oil revenue and build a lasting endowment
from oil wealth to benefit future generations.
The fund was set up in 1990 but no money
was available to invest into the fund until
1996 when oil prices began to recover. Today, Norway’s trust fund is worth about $900
billion (Rosalsky 2014).
The U.S. has one example of a permanent trust at the federal level that benefits
public land counties. The U.S. Endowment
for Forestry and Communities was established as part of the Softwood Lumber Agreement between Canada and the U.S. in 2006.
The agreement established the Endowment
with $200 million; proceeds from the Endowment are used to fund educational and charitable activities in public land communities in
the U.S. (Owen 2016).
If a new endowment is established to
fund county payments, best management
practices can be gleaned from these examples. For example, to guard against raiding,
Congress could authorize an independent entity to establish and manage the Trust as it did
when it created the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities. Congress can also
mandate best practices already utilized elsewhere – for example, asset management strategies that are in accordance with the Prudent
Expert Rule (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974), inflation-proofing the
trust (Rodell 2018), and oversight by the Inspectors General of the U.S. Departments of
Agriculture and Interior.
Missed Opportunity for County Payments
The total value of timber harvests from all
Forest Service land since 1908 is about $80
billion (in 2016 dollars) (U.S. Department of
Agriculture 2016). Had Congress followed
the example of the states and established an
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endowment in 1908 instead of annual revenue sharing payments, it would distribute
$3.2 billion today to counties and schools,
three times larger than the maximum revenue
sharing payment made in 1977 and 213 times
larger than actual payments made in FY 2017
(Headwaters Economics 2014). Had Congress established an endowment in 1977 instead of PILT, it would be worth $12.3 billion
today and distribute payments equal to $308
million. Had Congress established an endowment in 2000 instead of SRS, it would be
worth $1.3 billion today and distribute $33
million.
Commercial receipts from federal
lands remain at relatively low levels. Establishing a permanent trust today only with
funding from commercial receipts would take
time to build a significant endowment (68
years to replace SRS). With Congress considering forest management reform and new
uses – and revenue streams – on public land,
establishing an endowment today creates the
framework to capture future receipts if they
rise and build a sizeable endowment more
quickly.
Conclusion
The way that county payments are made, including the certainty of payments and the
source of funding, is one of the most important and under-appreciated policies affecting the fiscal and economic well-being of
many public land counties and how public
lands are managed. The current models – revenue-sharing payments and discretionary appropriations from Congress – have failed to
provide predictable and fair compensation to
counties. This failure has exacerbated fiscal
crises in rural communities and left them unprepared to meet the economic challenges
and opportunities for public lands counties in
the 21st century economy. Remaking the fiscal relationship between public lands and
public land counties by establishing and

funding a permanent trust would stabilize and
grow revenue over time, eliminate the need
for annual Congressional appropriations, and
provide flexibility to address economic and
forest management solutions appropriate to
the needs of diverse public land counties in
the Pacific Northwest. The endowment
model also could begin to articulate an integrated public lands policy that better aligns
land management, economic development,
and county payments to benefit Pacific
Northwest communities.
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